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Privacy has been a significantsubject of scholarly attention for decades,
but it has never been more confusing than it is today. As myriad social
pressures inexorably corral an ever-growing share of the world's
population down the digital rabbithole, more and more people become
both users and targets of new technologies. The complexity of these
technologies and their unprecedented interactions with one another
have completely outstripped the ability of the populace as a whole to
understand the privacy implications of our new and shifting reality.
Confronting privacy questions in this context is all but paralyzing.
This Article offers a new framework for the conception of privacy and
privacy rights, which simplifies privacy questions in a hopelessly
complex environment and provides a basis for strengthening privacy
rights. That framework is built on a realist view of property rights,
which serves the critical analogical functions of clarifying our
relationship to our privacy interests and offering steadying guidance for
addressingprivacy questions that appear blurred by rapidtechnological
advancement. It is both notable and counterintuitive that to modernize
our theoretical understanding of privacy may require us to embrace a
model built on the real-property regime, which is classically
characterized by its adherence to long-standing, even arcane, commonlaw rules.
INTRODUCrION

In June of 2018, the Supreme Court decided Carpenter v. United
States, a highly-anticipated case concerning the Fourth Amendment
implications of cell phone users' cell-site location information (CSLI).
Whether for placing calls, sending or receiving messages, downloading
content, or in service of various other features, cell phones routinely
connect to nearby radio antennas known as "cell sites," sometimes as
often as several times per minute. Each connection generates a timestamped record that is maintained by the phone's service provider;
collectively, these records constitute CSLI. Pursuant to industry practice, service providers typically maintain CSLI for five years.' The
generation and maintenance of CSLI can therefore create a detailed
map of the location of a cell phone over a several-year period.2
In Carpenter, prosecutors obtained over four months' worth of
CSLI for a criminal defendant's phone, and used the nearly 13,000
1. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
2. The precision with which CSLI can reveal the location of a phone varies in part with the
concentration of cell sites in a given area. Mr. Carpenter's data placed his phone "within a
wedge-shaped sector ranging from one-eighth to four square miles." Id. at 2218.
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location points contained in those records to argue that the defendant
was near a series of RadioShack locations at the time they were
robbed. Prosecutors did not first obtain a warrant for Mr. Carpenter's
CSLI; instead, they acquired the records under a less demanding standard through the Stored Communications Act (SCA). 3 Noting that
CSLI can be collected "at practically no expense" 4 and provides "near
perfect surveillance" 5 of a person's historical location, the Court held
that individuals "maintain[ ] a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
record of [their] physical movements as captured through CSLI." 6 As
a result, "accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search"'7 and requires a warrant supported by probable cause.
Justice Gorsuch dissented. The majority observed that, "For much
of our history, Fourth Amendment search doctrine was 'tied to common-law trespass' and focused on whether the Government 'obtains
information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected
area,'"' and Justice Gorsuch counseled a return to that approach.
Rather than consider whether Mr. Carpenter had an expectation of
privacy in his CSLI, per Katz v. United States, Justice Gorsuch argued
for a "more traditional" Fourth Amendment analysis of CSLI, under
which the Court would consider whether Carpenter has a property
right in the records of his phone's location. 9 Notwithstanding the fact
that a third-party phone service provider is the creator of such
records, Justice Gorsuch suggested that Carpenter might still have
prevailed under a property analysis.' 0
It is no accident that the loci of constitutional privacy rights are, by
and large, pieces of property (specifically houses, papers, and effects"). Any compelling theory of privacy must protect certain property. But Justice Gorsuch's dissent gestures at a broader truth: Even to
the extent that privacy reaches beyond the realm of property, it is best
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
4. Id. at 2218.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2217.
7. Id. at 2217 n.3.
8. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405, 406 n.3
(2012)).
9. Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
10. Id. ("It seems to me entirely possible a person's cell-site data could qualify as his papers or
effects under existing law.") (emphasis in original). But see Orin Kerr, How Should an Originalist Rule in the Fourth Amendment Cell-site Case?, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/amphtml/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/13/how-should-an-originalistrule-in-the-fourth-amendment-cell-site-case/?-twitterimpression=true (expressing skepticism
that Carpenter would possess property rights in the CSLI at issue).
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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understood on a property model-whether under constitutional law,
common law, statutory law, or human rights law. This Article makes
the case for that novel proposition by articulating a theory of privacy
and privacy rights modeled on the real-property regime. 12
More specifically, this Article argues that "privacy" describes the
state of a domain or private sphere-akin to real property we might
own, but not entirely physical-that encompasses certain important
personal interests extending above and beyond the mere economic.
That domain includes both material objects (such as our bodies and
certain real and personal property) and immaterial concepts (including certain liberties and our reputations).
This Article then appeals to property rights in a new way: It is not
that we "own" our privacy or private matters in the way that we own
property (even though we simultaneously own certain property that is
considered private). It is that rights to policing our private spheres are
more readily understood on the model of rights in real property-that
is, as rights to exclude others (or not) from the private domain, rights
to alienate items within that domain, and rights to enjoy that domain.1 3 Adopting this model has a variety of significant theoretical
and practical benefits analyzed below.
Although a number of legal scholars have explored connections between privacy rights and property rights, those scholars generally argue that subcomponents of our privacy (especially private data)
should be treated as if they are actually our personal property.14
Within the narrow confines of the question before the Carpenter
Court, that is essentially what Justice Gorsuch advocates in his dissent.
12. By contrast, much of the literature focuses on the notion of privacy to the exclusion of
privacy rights. See, e.g., Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1087 (2002)
[hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy]; Ruth Gavison, Privacy & the Limits of Law, 89
YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295
(1975); James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323 (1975); Andrei
Marmor, What Is the Right to Privacy?, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 23 (2015).

13. I adopt the typical definition of the term "real property": Land, and structures on land
that cannot readily be moved, such as buildings. Real Property, L. DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/real-property/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2017). A major reason for relying on real-property
rights rather than personal- or intellectual-property rights is the historical relationship between
real property and privacy, as well as the analogical utility of real property for conceptualizing the
private sphere. Yet another reason is the strictness of penalties for trespasses on real property, as
discussed further below.
14. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2055, 2056 (2004) (identifying a "model of propertized personal information" that could support
a market in personal data); Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy and the Pursuitof Integrated Electronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 631 (2009) (focusing on the question of who owns
a patient's medical records); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/InformationProperty, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1283, 1287-88 n.19 (2000) (collecting articles on the notion that people should own data
about themselves).
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Such analyses are not intended to capture the whole of privacy (let
alone privacy rights), and they are often premised on economic considerations-driven by the idea of property as an asset with monetary
value. Because private information can be economically valuable, it is
not difficult to imagine a market for selling it, just like property. Additionally, because one can have privacy interests in one's property,
some connection between the two is manifest. For example, my privacy interests in the content of a personal letter are arguably bound
up with my property interests in the letter itself.
Yet a typical understanding of privacy also comprises non-property,
including more abstract notions, such as one's reputation, or one's liberty to make particular personal or familial decisions. Those items are
less obviously suitable to be treated as actual property, even if we focus on economic considerations alone. Moreover, as explained below,
economic analyses do not exhaust the value of property, nor do they
strike at the heart of privacy.1 5 Indeed, even the Fourth Amendment
protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ...
"16 We do not "own" our person in
against unreasonable searches.
the same sense that we own our houses, papers or effects. The very
text of the Fourth Amendment therefore suggests that privacy rights
cannot be understood literally as property rights so much as structurally similar to property rights.
This Article therefore draws on property rights for their theoretical
suitability, power to simplify privacy questions, and social justice implications when used to model our understanding of privacy and privacy rights. The analysis that follows explores the powerful
explanatory force of the property-rights system for capturing a full
range of perceived privacy violations. The model also simplifies complex privacy questions in several respects: It allows us to visualize all
privacy violations on a physical model, even in intangible domains like
cyberspace; it allows us to categorize and interpret privacy violations
based on clear rules from the property context; and it channels common, normative intuitions about the proper strength of privacy rights
by drawing explicitly on a famously potent rights regime.
This Article comprises three Sections. Section I defends the notion
of the private sphere, a common but controversial idea in the privacy
literature. This Section draws on the work of noted privacy scholar
Daniel Solove" 7-a critic of the private sphere-to define the concept
15. Slippage in the other direction is possible as well: One can have interests in property that
are not in any meaningful way tied to one's privacy.
16. U.S. CONs-r. amend. IV.
17. Solove, ConceptualizingPrivacy, supra note 12.
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via a two-step analytical process that first identifies a prima facie private sphere and then identifies a true private sphere. Section II develops the real-property model for understanding privacy rights as rights
to exclude, alienate, and enjoy.1 8 Section III discusses the key implications of adopting a real-property model of privacy rights. Those implications include certain advantages of the model, such as its simplicity
and suitability for rendering comprehensible privacy questions related
to cyberspace, as well as its favorable implications for enforcement of
privacy rights. Section III also explores the explanatory power of the
real-property model for common, intuitive misgivings about the thirdparty doctrine, the famous evidentiary rule that has come under increasing scrutiny in the digital age. Lastly, Section III discusses several
important respects in which privacy and real property differ. The Article then concludes by briefly considering the limits of a real-property
model of privacy.
I.

THE PRIVATE SPHERE

The existence of a private sphere is heavily disputed among privacy
scholars. 19 Although many theorists write in terms that suggest their
recognition of such a domain, 20 others reject the idea. 2 1 Some scholars
also interpret privacy or privacy rights as a matter of control, whether
over personal information or over private matters more broadly conceived. 22 For those who accept a control view, the private sphere offers a natural shorthand for denoting the matters over which one
should have control.
18. Crucially, this account of privacy rights is compatible with more or less any view of the
private sphere, and thus it stands immune to many of the objections one might raise to the
argumentation in Section I.

&

19. For a helpful catalog of theories of privacy, see Solove's impressive collection and categorization of theories in Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 12.
20. See, e.g., Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom, in Nomos XIII: PRIVACY 71,
72 (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971) ("The territory that we claim as our private
sphere varies with the adversary we face."); Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL.
Pun. AFF. 315, 316 (1975) ("I shall refer to these laws and conventions as defining a 'zone' or
'territory."'); see also HELEN NISSENBAUM,

PRIVACY IN CONTExr: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND

INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 94-96 (2010) (noting other scholars who take a similar view).

21. See Solove, ConceptualizingPrivacy, supra note 12, at 1131-32 (observing that "the metaphor of space has significant limitations," and that "[w]e can avoid allowing the metaphor of
space to limit our understanding of privacy").
22. See id. at 1109-15 (discussing views of privacy defined in terms of control over information); see also Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RuTGERs L. REv. 275, 279 (1974)
("Fried, Miller, Gross and others were correct to define privacy as a form of power or control
over something."); Marmor, supra note 12, at 3-4 (arguing that privacy is "grounded in people's
interest in having a reasonable measure of control over the ways in which they can present
themselves (and what is theirs) to others").
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Yet debates about privacy are often muddled. There is a manifest
distinction between privacy and privacy rights. 23 That distinction is not
often made clearly, and its absence can lead to confusion. Certain theories treat privacy itself as concerning control over certain sensitive
matters, such that loss of control is itself a loss of privacy. 24 Others
treat privacy rights as rights of control, independently of the question
of what qualifies as private. 25 Criticisms of control views can reinforce
the confusion by similarly omitting the distinction. Although some critiques seem to reject the notion that privacy itself is a matter of control, they do not always make their stance clear. 26 Other criticisms of
control accounts are ambiguous as to which idea they reject. 2 7
This Article defends the view that privacy rights are rights of control over access to and interference in the various domains that collectively constitute the private sphere, whether those domains are
physical, mental, digital, or informational. As argued in Section II, the
rights of control over the private domain closely resemble major categories of real-property rights and should be understood on a similar
model. Privacy is the state of one's private sphere (or, depending on
the context, the state of some portion of one's private sphere)namely, whether and to what extent the private sphere has been compromised by others. 28 The value of privacy becomes apparent through
an examination of the ways in which we choose to exercise our privacy
rights to control the borders of the private sphere.
But why accept the idea of a private sphere paired with a control
view of privacy rights? One approach to examining privacy might be
to canvass the interests that society seems to denote as private in an
attempt to locate a common thread. This appears to be what noted
privacy scholar Daniel Solove refers to as the "traditional method." 29
Of the various challenges posed by that approach, one is especially
salient: Identifying the subjects of privacy interests at the broadest
23. That distinction applies to the subject of more or less any rights. Privacy rights protect our
interests in privacy, just like property rights protect our interests in property.
24. E.g., Parker, supra note 22.
25. E.g., Marmor, supra note 12; Rachels, supra note 12.
26. See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 12, at 427 (discussing problems with understanding privacy
both as a matter of weak control and as a matter of strong control); Thomson, supra note 12, at
304-05 n.1 (taking aim at Parker's view of privacy-not privacy rights-being defined in terms
of control).
27. See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 12, at 1109-15 (describing various challenges to control-over-information accounts that do not hinge on the distinction between accounts of privacy and accounts of privacy rights).
28. It is not entirely clear how this view would be classified under Solove's taxonomy. See
generally id.
29. Id at 1095-96.
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level does not necessarily reveal much about how to understand privacy rights;even an uncontroversial list of interests could warrant protection in a variety of ways. I propose instead to work in the other
direction, in what might be characterized by Solove as a variation on
the traditional method. By considering whether there is a common
thread in cognizable privacy violations, we may reveal structural features of privacy rights that could inform the sorts of interests that
should be protected as private as a matter of theoretical consistency.
Solove has developed a thorough taxonomy of privacy violations
that serve this purpose nicely. 3 0 A review of those violations reveals a
common thread explicable in terms of rights to police a self-regarding
domain, most notably by regulating the access of others. Solove identifies four broad categories of legally-recognized privacy intrusions:
information collection, information processing, information dissemination, and invasion.31 According to Solove, information collection
covers violations pegged to surveillance and interrogation. 32 Information processing comprises violations related to the aggregation of
data, identification of the people that various data concern, data insecurity, secondary use of data (or the use of data for a purpose other
than for which it was provided), and "exclusion" (or "the failure to
provide individuals with notice and input about their records"). 33 Information dissemination encompasses breaches of confidentiality, improper disclosure of information, exposure (a variation of improper
disclosure), increased accessibility of information (which increases the
chances of an improper disclosure), blackmail, appropriation (of another's identity), and distortion (of one's reputation). 34 Finally, invasion includes intrusions into "a private realm" and interference with
personal decisions.3 5
All of these sorts of violations can be understood in terms of the
notion that there is a zone around each individual over which she is
entitled to control access or use-whether the zone is defined to encompass certain types of data or freedom to make certain decisions
without interference. Notably, most of the violations concern access or
the threat of access to information. This suggests that we should think
about privacy rights as rights of control over a private domain; and
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
Id. at 478.
Id. at 491, 499.
See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. at 548-49, 553.
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that domain, in significant part, should encompass sensitive
information. 36
There are numerous ways of defining the contours of the private
domain. It is possible to pair any number of accounts of the private
sphere with the real-property analysis offered in Section II. But the
very nature of a control account of privacy rights points to some helpful parameters for identifying the private domain. A primary reason
that control is valuable, if it is, is that it is empowering to us as agents.
Moreover, the interests typically protected or advanced by privacy are
closely linked to human agency. For example, Ruth Gavison suggests
that we claim privacy across varied situations for similar reasons, including "promotion of liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human relations, and furthering the existence of a free society."3 7 Andrei
Marmor defends a view of privacy "grounded in people's interest in
having a reasonable measure of control over the ways in which they
can present themselves (and what is theirs) to others." 38 James
Rachels locates the value of privacy in large part in "our ability to
create and maintain different sorts of relationships with different people." 39 All of these theorists appear to see privacy as serving our ability to set the terms on which we engage with each other and the world
at large. On a control account, it is plausible that privacy serves to
empower us as agents, and the private sphere should encompass zones
where regulating access is of special normative significance in doing
S0.40 The view defended here is therefore an agency-oriented view of
privacy paired with a control view of privacy rights.
36. It is worth noting that Solove's review of various theories of privacy seems to substantiate
this result. See generally Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 12. That review breaks
down into six different categories: the right to be let alone, limited access to the self, secrecy,
control over personal information, personhood, and intimacy. Id. at 1092. The distinctions
among some of these categories are arguably rather thin for all are at least superficially and
obviously explicable in terms of control over access to oneself, one's relationships or one's information. The label for the "personhood" category may not be self-explanatory, but upon closer
examination, it fits the same pattern. Solove identifies two strands of "personhood" theories: one
based around individuality, dignity, and autonomy, and another oriented around anti-totalitarianism. Id. at 1116. According to Solove, personhood theories concern the "protection of the
integrity of the personality," which touches upon, inter alia, "what aspects of the self should be
limited, or what information we should have control over." Id. Once more, the notion of control
figures prominently.
37. Gavison, supra note 12, at 423.
38. Marmor, supra note 12, at 3-4.
39. Rachels, supra note 12, at 326.
40. As discussed further below, Marmor is wary of defining the value of autonomy in terms of
privacy, arguing that, "[i]f you equate the right to privacy with the right to personal autonomy,
you just admit that no particular interest in privacy exists that is worthy of protection, distinct
from the much broader and, admittedly more important right to personal autonomy." Marmor,
supra note 12, at 25. If privacy serves a distinctive feature of autonomy, however, this objection
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The Prima Facie Private Sphere

As an initial step, let us designate as "primafacie private" any zone
the intrusion upon which has especially important implications for our
agency-that is, how we set the terms on which we engage with the
world. This formulation is necessarily rough and leaves space for disagreement about what it encompasses, but it will serve as a starting
point.
At a minimum, the prima facie private sphere captures our mental
processes (like thoughts, memories, and intentions); our bodies; our
homes and certain sensitive personal effects (like computers and
phones); and certain information about us (especially, but not exclusively, information that bears on our mental processes, bodies, and
sensitive personal effects). 41 Mental processes constitute the heart of
our agency and thus warrant special protection on an agency-driven
account of privacy. Our bodies provide our fundamental means of
confronting and maneuvering about the world. Sensitive property
(like homes, phones and computers) gives us zones or tools to form
intimate bonds with others, to explore ideas, and to develop our personalities. Finally, certain information (such as health information),
when held by others, can have especially far-reaching implications for
our freedom to pursue various goals and projects in the world. 42 It
may well be the case that additional items are prima facie private, but
we may set those aside for present purposes. 43
is not necessarily troubling. That is precisely the view taken here-namely, that the various
strands of privacy are bound together by distinctive and common features.
41. On this view, certain famous-or perhaps notorious-court cases concerning rights to regulate our bodies are properly decided as a matter of privacy, as discussed infra notes 63-64.
42. There is some overlap among these categories, especially to the extent that accessing certain domains (such as examining another's body or personal effects) reveals information that can
be private. As articulated here, this list would likely trigger an objection from scholars like
Solove that specificity is lacking. See infra Section I.D. It is perfectly true that a further level of
detail would be important for applying a theory of privacy, but rendering that level of detail is
not the purpose of this Article. I contend that it is possible to flesh out the list significantly
(albeit, perhaps, not without controversy) in a manner that substantially blunts Solove's vagueness concerns. At the very least, there is no reason to doubt the possibility of elaborating on this
list further. However, at this point, the purpose of presenting the list is simply to outline the
domains that present privacy considerations so that it is possible to make sense of the realproperty model presented infra. The areas listed here conventionally fall at least in part within
the private domain, and, as argued here, there is a good reason for that. Accepting that these
categories contain private items-whether arguendo or because the agency-oriented account is
compelling-is adequate to move the instant analysis forward.
43. Although the protected subdomains are defined by their influence over human agency, it
does not follow that any single invasion of a domain that is prima facie private in fact has devastating effects on our agency. Like many rights we have, the depth of harms caused by violations
can vary from the trivial to the catastrophic. Part of the virtue of understanding a control account in this way is that it allows us to conceptualize the private sphere as composed of categori-
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Some items that are prima facie private are intrinsically connected
to human agency, such as one's mental processes. For example,
manipulating another's thoughts would interfere in a fundamental
way with that person's agency and therefore would constitute a prima
facie violation of one's privacy.44 Other matters are prima facie private
because of contingent facts, such as social practices. Consider the example of Social Security numbers, which are a purely social construction that serve to identify individuals and thereby provide access to
important rights and benefits. Loss of control over one's Social Security number can compromise the ability to access not just those rights
and benefits, but even one's identity in other various interactions.
Some items that are prima facie private may be difficult to classify
as intrinsically or contingently significant. Certain facts about one's
body or health status might seem to qualify. For example, the dissemination of particular health information can lead to social stigma, and
those facts might be prima facie private only because of how they are
perceived in a given time and place. 4 5 As a result, such facts might
seem to warrant prima facie privacy protection only for contingent
reasons. Yet some information about one's body or health can inherently reveal important information about one's agentic capacities and
processes (independently of any additional stigma)-such as whether
a person suffers from certain cognitive impairments-objectively undermining one's ability to engage socially with others.
Prima facie private designations for physical spaces and personal
property might also seem difficult to classify, though such domains are
likely to be intrinsically linked to human agency. 46 It is hard to imagcal subdomains (rather than as comprising individual matters), which provides some measure of
clarity in discerning the boundaries of another's private sphere.
44. As discussed below, however, overt or explicit manipulation of another's thoughts probably cannot fall within the true private sphere for reasons of practicality. See infra Section I.B.
45. Stigmatizing information is among the most sensitive information about us precisely because it so seriously affects our ability to engage with the world. The notion that protection of
reputation is a matter of privacy is widely recognized in the law, as well. For example, there are
privacy torts aimed at protecting reputation, such as false light. See William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (listing false light as one of four privacy torts). Reputation is
also protected under the heading of privacy as a matter of human rights law. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (barring "unlawful attacks" on one's "honor and reputation").
46. That real property can constitute part of one's private sphere presents an analytical opportunity when combined with the fact that the account presented here models privacy rights on
real-property rights. Those propositions jointly imply that certain forms of real property can
serve as a partial or miniature representation of the private sphere. The most salient form of real
property that falls within the private sphere is one's home, although that is not necessarily the
only example. The property rights regime protects a number of interests beyond privacy. See
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL. L. REV. 531 (2005)
(offering an account of the value of property without once mentioning the word "privacy"). But
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ine a life devoid of private physical domains, such as a living space out
of the public eye or a vessel (whether material or digital) for the expression of our most closely-held doubts, insecurities, and aspirations.
It seems obviously true that such domains are truly integral to the
exercise of human agency, for they offer us the opportunity to flourish
largely unburdened by the social demands of the community. That includes the freedom to express sentiments or explore ideas without the
risk of social judgment; the power to forge intimate relationships with
others that are defined, in part, by their exclusive nature; 47 the opportunity to craft a public face for engaging with the world (whether
through experimentation with modes of dress or speech, or otherwise); a venue for rest and the management of one's personal physical
and emotional needs; and the chance to develop a free-standing identity. Perhaps, however, we have been conditioned by reasonably widespread access to such domains to think they are essential. Perhaps,
that is, it would be possible to thrive under different social conventions that result in substantially less physical privacy.4 8
For our purposes, it is not especially important whether anything
designated as prima facie private belongs there inherently or contingently. It is worth noting, however, that permitting contingent items in
the prima facie private sphere will result in a conception of that sphere
that varies to some extent across time and place. Similarly, the significance of certain privacy intrusions may also differ as a result of social
conventions. The flexibility to accommodate such changes is a virtue
in a theory of privacy.
B.

The True Private Sphere

As a second analytical step, we may now designate the actual private sphere. Not everything that is prima facie private falls into the
real-property rights also protect our privacy to a substantial degree because the home is such an
important part of the private sphere. See infra Section III.B.
47. As discussed below, selectively sharing private information can be deeply empowering, for
entrusting others with such information can be essential to forging especially deep and lasting
bonds. See generally Rachels, supra note 12 (focusing on the role of privacy in forging and managing significant social relationships).
48. For example, social conventions concerning access to and use of physical space have
changed significantly over time. See, e.g., Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 32 (1998) (noting some significant developments during the Renaissance);
Solove, ConceptualizingPrivacy, supra note 12, at 1137-40 (discussing the history of the home).
History may reveal that we are in fact adaptable with respect to our ostensible need for physical
privacy, although the mere fact that social conventions may have significantly limited our physical privacy in the past will not be sufficient to support such a conclusion. It may be the case that,
in societies characterized by more limited physical privacy, individuals simply persisted in a
suboptimal state, subject to artificial and unfortunate limitations on the exercise of their agency.
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true private sphere, but everything within the true private sphere will
also be prima facie private. The private sphere therefore comprises a
subset of that which is prima facie private. Specifically, the true private sphere includes primafacie private items: (1) over which we have
not given up control or (2) over which there are no other decisive
reasons to restrict our ability to assert privacy protections.
Regarding the first limitation, if I sufficiently publicize information
about myself that is prima facie private, that information will no
longer qualify for inclusion in the true private sphere; under the
proper circumstances, I will have waived my rights to control access to
that information (or alienated that information, to use the property
analogy drawn out below), and therefore I will have pushed the information out of my true private sphere. 4 9
The second limitation is more complicated but no less important.
One compelling reason to exclude a matter that is prima facie private
from the true private sphere is that it is essentially impossible to give
agents rights of control over such a matter. Consider the notion that
one's thoughts and memories are primafacie private. I take this to be
reasonably uncontroversial; absent special circumstances, like being
placed under oath or bearing a special relationship to someone posing
a question to us, the outside world is not generally entitled to have
free access to our recollections, opinions, or intentions. Those elements of our mental process are not only primafacie private; they also
fall within the private sphere. Compelling someone to reveal those
types of items-such as through a coerced polygraph exam-would
typically amount to an invasion of privacy.5 0
But consider the private enjoyment of one's own mental domain.
On the view laid out above, forcing one's way into another's thoughts
or causing them to relive unwanted memories may be an invasion of a
prima facie private domain. After all, it can involve imposing on one
of the identified zones without permission or invitation. It can even
have deep implications for the exercise of human agency. Imagine a
young woman working through the painful trauma of experiencing a
miscarriage. Suppose she suffered an early-term loss, and she has revealed neither the pregnancy nor the loss to anyone else. By chance,
as part of a promotion run by a local store, she receives coupons in the
49. An exploration of the conditions for relinquishing control over matters that are prima
facie private is extremely important for answering privacy questions in the digital age, but it is
also an extended and lengthy exercise best reserved for a subsequent article.
50. A well-known fictional example might be "legilimency" from the Harry Potter stories, a
magical method for accessing another's thoughts or memories. See generally J. K. ROWLING,
HARRY PoTrER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX (2003).
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mail for baby formula.5 1 It is not difficult to imagine that the receipt of
those coupons might trigger debilitating memories for the young
woman. Many may nevertheless resist treating a case like this one as a
violation of privacy-that is, as an invasion of the private sphere.
One compelling explanation is that, although there has been an uninvited intrusion into the woman's prima facie private domain, social
realities render it effectively impossible in most instances for us as
agents to assert the violation of our rights over unwanted impositions
on our thoughts. 52 Mental solitude might require physical and social
solitude, which are rare and possibly undesirable for other reasons.
Under radically different circumstances-perhaps if individuals were
routinely segregated from each other and could actually screen out
unsolicited contact with others-the private sphere might encompass
the young woman's situation. As the world is presently configured, to
regard such intrusions as violations of the true private sphere would
fundamentally complicate our view of rights by suggesting the existence of rights that cannot be vindicated in any meaningful way.5 3

Other compelling reasons (including overriding moral reasons)
might exist for excluding matters that are prima facie private from the
actual private sphere. Reproductive rights serve as a controversial but
illustrative example. On the account proposed here, a pregnant
woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy would be prima facie private
because it concerns her treatment of her own body-in a medical context no less. Those who believe that the termination of a pregnancy is
murder might claim that the moral significance of a termination renders the choice to terminate a non-private matter. 54 Under this view,
the choice would arguably be excluded from the private sphere because of overriding moral concerns. Similarly, a society that places significant value on freedom of speech might limit the ability of
individuals to constrain the dissemination of shared prima face private
information, such as details about a private relationship between two
people that one of the two wishes to publish.5 5
51. To screen out confounding factors that might trigger misleading intuitions about the privacy interests at stake, it is important for the purposes of this example that the young woman
receives the coupons by chance, rather than being targeted. We can stipulate that the company
never obtained information about the young woman's pregnancy.
52. Others might argue that this is not relevant to privacy at all because the company mailing
out the coupons does not know the young woman was pregnant. Part of the point of this analysis
is to suggest that such a conclusion is mistaken.
53. At the same time, classifying the case as one involving an intrusion upon the young
woman's prima facie private sphere empowers us to explain why it is unfortunate.
54. This is not my view; I offer it only as an example.
55. Helen Nissenbaum has argued that "what bothers people" about current informationgathering practices "is not that they diminish our control and pierce our secrecy, but that they
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There can be good faith disagreement over whether matters are
merely prima facie private or fall also within the private sphere. Those
disagreements may turn on different assessments of whether someone
has waived control over a matter or whether a stated purpose for
treating a prima facie private matter as non-private is sufficiently
weighty. Additionally, to the extent there is a "correct" answer in such
disputes, that answer could change over time. In fact, this formulation
generally allows for some variation across time and place on that
which is deemed worthy of protection as a matter of privacy. As new
modes of engaging with the world as agents become available-for
example, through the rapid evolution of digital technologies-the contours of the prima facie private and the private sphere will necessarily
shift. I nevertheless take it as true that some private domain is essential for agents in any given time or place. It is of course possible to
imagine a dystopian society where there is no such thing as a private
sphere, but that society would be composed of fundamentally crippled
agents. 56
In any event, I propose a working definition of the private sphere
for the following analysis that captures (to the extent possible, within
the guidance above) the mind, the body, certain sensitive or personal
information, and pivotal property that plays a significant role in setting the terms on which we engage with the world (e.g., homes, cell
phones, computers, books, and so forth). As noted above, the realproperty model of privacy described in Section II can make sense of a
range of control accounts of privacy; it is not essential to accept the
view of the private sphere defended in this Section. There are a variety of reasons for which one could favor different conceptions of the
private sphere. For example, on the view of the private sphere outlined here, privacy is intrinsically valuable because it empowers us as
agents at a basic level. Even the choice to give up one's privacy can be
empowering. That may not be true for just any account of the private
transgress context-relative informational norms." NISSENBAUM, supra note 20, at 186. That view
is fundamentally at odds with the view defended here, but the space between the prima facie
private sphere and the true private sphere allows those compelled by Nissenbaum's view to graft
their intuitions about norms onto a control view of privacy rights. One could accept the view that
sufficiently meritorious context-relative informational norms limit those prima facie private
items that also appear in the true private sphere.
56. This two-step analysis-separately delineating the prima facie and true private spheresmay render my approach more compatible with Solove's. In Conceptualizing Privacy, Solove
argues for a "pragmatic approach" to privacy to minimize disruptions to key social practices. See
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 12, at Part II. Although Solove might prefer to
reject the notion (defended here) that there is a single overarching purpose to privacy, it is
conceivable that the practices he is concerned about could be used to identify the subset of
prima facie private matters that make the cut into the true private sphere.
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sphere. The key point is that the private sphere should encompass
sub-domains over which dominion is central to the vindication of the
values served by privacy. A different understanding of the function of
privacy would lead to a different understanding of the private sphere.
C.

Competing Views of the Private Sphere

Competing accounts of the private sphere help provide context for
the foregoing and can also be understood via a two-step analysis. Consider the account developed by James Rachels. Rachels examines the
idea that "there is a close connection between our ability to control
who has access to us and to information about us, and our ability to
create and maintain different sorts of social relationships with different people." 5 7 By his own terms, Rachels appears to endorse some
version of a "control" account of privacy rights, although he provides
somewhat less detail on what control entails. Rachels's view implies a
private sphere consisting of information the control over which is crucial for managing our social interactions.
In fairness, Rachels acknowledges other values of privacy, and presumably would therefore recognize other matters as falling within the
private sphere, but his focus is on the social dimension of privacy.58
Imagine, for the sake of argument, if Rachels believed that autonomy
with respect to social interaction is the only meaningful value vindicated by privacy. That view could be fitted with the theoretical framework laid out above. It would take the form of a narrower conception
of the private sphere than I have defended, over which some form of
control is crucial in service of a particular value.
Andrei Marmor has recently put forward such an account. As noted
briefly above, on Marmor's view, privacy is "grounded in people's interest in having a reasonable measure of control over the ways in
which they can present themselves (and what is theirs) to others." 5 9
This is also a narrower understanding of the virtue of privacy than I
have defended, and it is built around the dimension of privacy explored by Rachels.
Marmor and I disagree rather substantially. Whereas I have linked
privacy to autonomy in a direct way, Marmor explicitly warns against
conflating privacy and autonomy. 60 Marmor argues that, if "you
equate the right to privacy with the right to personal autonomy, you
57. Rachels, supra note 12, at 326.
58. See id. at 323-25 (noting various consequences from others gaining access to private information, including loss of competitive advantage, embarrassment, and financial repercussions).
59. Marmor, supra note 12, at 3-4.
60. Id. at 25.
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just admit that no particular interest in privacy exists that is worthy of
protection, distinct from the much broader and, admittedly, more important right to personal autonomy." 61 Of course, I have not equated
privacy with autonomy. I have defended the view that privacy serves a
distinctive role in preserving and augmenting autonomy-namely that
privacy designates domains over which a reasonable level of control
against others is essential for setting the terms on which we engage
with the world. Thus, on my view, privacy and autonomy are inextricably linked because the former plays a special role in securing the latter, and that special role gives privacy a distinctive character.
As a result of this difference, Marmor also openly acknowledges
that his account is exclusively outward-facing and that his view of privacy does not protect actions. 62 That means his account cannot make
sense of impositions on the uses of our bodies, at least not as violations of privacy. He is therefore compelled to conclude that legal decisions like Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade-which
respectively protect the rights to use contraception and to obtain an
abortion on constitutional privacy grounds-are confused. 63 I take it
as a virtue of the approach I have defended that it can accommodate
fundamental privacy jurisprudence like these cases. 64
Marmor is mistaken in part because of his analytical starting point.
He imagines a "global Panopticon" where "walls are made of glass
with no blinds or shades of any kind, every conversation can be heard
by others, and nothing you say or do can be hidden from anyone. Everything is there for anyone to see, hear, or smell." 6 5 Marmor then proceeds to ask what is lost in a world like that, concluding that "it is, first
and foremost, our social lives that would be severely compromised,
not necessarily or primarily our inner or private world." 66
Imagining the global Panopticon can be analytically helpful, no
doubt. Perhaps Marmor is right about the social implications of a
world without walls. But it begs the question to assume that a world
61. Id.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Id. at 24-25 ("No doubt there are some concerns about privacy in the Griswold case, but
the Court's rationale that the right to use contraceptives derives from the right to privacy seems
patently wrong.").
64. The account of the private sphere defended here would unequivocally encompass reproductive rights, which is of particular significance given the recent shift in the political balance of
the Supreme Court that could curtail those rights. Absent additional normative assumptions, my
view of the private sphere cannot dictate when the termination of a pregnancy should be permitted, but the model explains why some of the weighty interests at stake are precisely the privacy
interests of the pregnant woman.
65. Marmor, supra note 12, at 6.
66. Id. at 7.
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without walls exemplifies a world without privacy. Marmor essentially
assumes that perpetual physical observation exhausts the range of
possible privacy intrusions. A view derived from that assumption
would have no reason to consider the integrity of mental processes or
freedom from restrictions on the use of our bodies, and therefore no
reason to consider whether notions such as these share central or defining features with freedom from physical observation. 6 7 In short, it is
no wonder he arrives at a narrower conception of the value of privacy.
By contrast, I have attempted to avoid an ad hoc limitation on how to
understand the sorts of matters protected by the private sphere by
attempting to locate a common thread to the sorts of violations that
are widely considered privacy violations.
In any event, notwithstanding these differences, Marmor's view can
also be understood on the model proposed above, including via the
real-property analysis outlined in Section II. Marmor's prima facie private sphere would comprise matters that bear sufficiently on the ways
in which people can present themselves (and what is theirs) to others.
Whether those matters would also fall within the private sphere would
depend on whether it is generally reasonable for individuals to assert
rights of control over them. At the very least, based on his Panopticon
example, we might think Marmor's sphere would contain certain real
property (like the home) and certain information about us.
For good measure, consider how one further, prominent view of privacy might fit with the account defined here. Ruth Gavison's view,
noted briefly above, begins from a hypothetical starting point of a
state of "perfect privacy."6 Gavison argues that an individual enjoys
perfect privacy when nobody has any information about him, pays any
attention to him, or has physical access to him. 6 9 In Gavison's terminology, these three dimensions along which one can enjoy privacy
correlate with "secrecy," "anonymity," and "solitude," which are "distinct and independent, but interrelated" elements of privacy. 70
The thrust of Gavison's view of privacy is compatible with an agentoriented control account of privacy rights. Secrecy and solitude both
align with parts of the private sphere defined above-specifically, dominion over sensitive information about oneself and access to one's
67. Marmor could just as well have started with the world described by Margaret Atwood in
The Handmaid's Tale, where, in addition to pervasive (albeit not omnipresent) physical observation, members of a significant subset of the population also lack the power to control access to
their own bodies. See generally MARGARET ArwOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986).
68. Gavison, supra note 12, at 428.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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body.7 1 If nobody has any information about me or any access to me
physically, by definition I have yet to lose control over any sensitive
matters that may undermine my agency. 72 Gavison may not attach
much significance to control, but the link between her view of privacy
and the effect on human agency is clear enough.
Although described by Gavison as simply another dimension of privacy, anonymity is a different sort of concept. Gavison explains anonymity through the example of the president attempting to walk down
the street "incognito." 7 3 Gavison notes that, were someone to call out,
"Here is the President," the president would lose his temporary anonymity simply because others on the street would begin to pay attention to him. 7 4 Thus, she concludes that merely being the subject of
others' attention results in a diminution of privacy.
This is a peculiar example for a variety of reasons. First, walking
down the street is an inherently public act. Watching or listening to a
man walk down the street may not violate his privacy at all, though it
might intrude upon his prima facie private domain. Second, and setting aside the question of whether someone has a right to walk down
the street without being the subject of attention, the notion that
merely being the subject of attention is a distinct way of losing privacy
seems misleading. To be the subject of attention is just to be the subject of attempts to penetrate one's private sphere (or, as here, perhaps
one's prima facie private sphere). In this case, serving as the subject of
attention is tantamount to being a target of prying eyes and ears as
one takes a stroll, intended to get physical or informational access to a
particular person. The attention only results in a loss of some anonymity if the people paying attention actually have some measure of access to the subject of the attention.
To the extent there is a meaningful intuition behind this example,
however, it is worth noting that, by paying attention to him, others on
the street are interfering with the president's ability to set the terms
on which he's engaging with the world (in perhaps a trivial or permissible way) by depriving him of the chance to walk anonymously and

71. Presumably they would fall within the private sphere that would accompany Marmor's
view as well.
72. A person enjoying perfect privacy as understood by Gavison is a person whose very existence the world appears not to acknowledge. That scenario, hypothetical though it is, raises a
variety of challenging questions about the nature of one's power to engage with the world. See
infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
73. Gavison, supra note 12, at 432.
74. Id.
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therefore undisturbed.7 5 That element of the situation can be captured
by the concepts of the prima facie private sphere and an understanding of privacy rights as rights of control.
Regardless of the wrinkle posed by the notion of anonymity, the
crucial point here is that a person in a state of perfect privacy as defined by Gavison exists in an undisturbed private sphere. As discussed
further below, privacy operates largely (though not entirely) as a oneway ratchet. Allowing access to the private sphere generally dilutes
one's power over the sphere, albeit often with various other positive
effects that explain why we routinely choose to invite others into the
sphere or push items out of it.76 Someone in a state of perfect privacy
has yet to make any irrevocable decisions about, for example, granting
others access to private information. The intuitions driving Gavison's
view can largely be accounted for by the view of privacy rights developed here.
In sum, although the contents of the prima facie private sphere and
the actual private sphere proposed here are not the subject of unanimous agreement, they and their link to human agency reflect central
elements of many other theories of privacy. To the extent one prefers
to adopt a smaller private sphere, the same model remains apt. For
the analysis in Section II, it is most important to assume that at least
some information, choices or activities are entitled to protection because they are "private."
75. There are other confounding features of Gavison's example. Most notably, it trades on the
fact that the title "president" identifies a person of note about whom the public typically possesses substantial information. An announcement that the president is walking down the street
would invite the attention of passersby because the president is an important person; and because he is important, many will already know or believe many things about him. Gavison claims
that "attention alone will cause a loss of privacy even if no new information becomes known."
Id. But that statement seems misleading. Even if Gavison is correct, her example still involves a
substantial loss of secrecy, at least vis-A-vis a particular man on the street. Before they recognize
the president, the other pedestrians fail to realize that they have information about the gentleman walking among them. That changes once they link that specific person with the information they each respectively possess about the president, such as his political party or his positions
on various public policy issues. Moreover, once they lay eyes on him, and identify him as the
important person they associate with the title, they would likely begin to acquire new information out of interest (for example, observing his posture, gait, height, facial expression, mode of
dress, and so forth). By contrast, if someone called out, "Here is Mike," as a random person
named "Mike" walks down the street, the loss of anonymity would probably be much less meaningful because nobody knows or cares much about Mike. (Of course, a loss of anonymity could
well involve a loss of privacy on my own view, but not simply because it corresponds with one
becoming the subject of attention.) Finally, Gavison's example may be problematic because, as a
public figure, the president may have an atypically small private sphere.
76. Of course, sharing certain private information with another can also conduce intimacy,
which in turn can generate new private information or subdomains as well.
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Objections to the Private Sphere

The foregoing two-step analysis is original and therefore has not yet
been subjected to criticism in the literature. But certain objections
have been raised previously that could apply to the approach advocated for in this Article. Solove, for one, has raised a number of concerns about various theories of privacy, some of which might reach the
proposal advanced here.
Some of Solove's concerns are glancing. One of his persistent worries is the purported vagueness of certain classes of theories. Whether
discussing right-to-be-let-alone theories, limited-access-to-self theories, or control-over-information theories, Solove has complained that
examples in the literature are simply not detailed enough to be helpful.7 7 That is less an objection to any particular class of theory than a

request for more detailed accounts. Unless he believes there is reason
for which no theory in any such family could ever provide the requisite
level of detail, at best his concerns about vagueness justify suspension
of an ultimate judgment. At some points, he seems to defend that
stronger view, suggesting that entire families of theories fundamentally suffer from vagueness.7 8 At others, he implies the problem could
be remedied by providing "an understanding of what matters are private and the value of privacy." 7 9 The preceding portions of this Article
offer an explanation of the value of privacy and a schematic description of what matters are private. To the extent that Solove might regard my own suggestions as excessively vague, I do not share his
apparent pessimism about the possibility of rendering sufficient further details.8 0
Some of Solove's concerns are more directly relevant. As his analysis implies, a control account of privacy rights presumes from the outset that there is such a thing as the private sphere-that is, a domain
over which a person ought to have some measure of control. Solove
has in fact questioned the merits of delineating a private sphere.81 For
one, he regards the metaphor of physical space as significantly limited
in illuminating non-spatial elements of privacy, such as privacy in
cyberspace. 82 This Article directly confronts that complaint in Section
77. See, e.g., Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy,supra note 12, at 1101-02, 1104, 1111 (raising an
objection about vagueness against different families of theories).
78. Id. at 1104 (claiming that, "[l]ike the right-to-be-let-alone conception, the limited-access
conception suffers from being too broad and too vague").
79. Id.
80. See discussion supra note 42.
81. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 12, at 1131-32.
82. Id. at 1131.
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III.A, arguing that, qua metaphor, the concept of physical space is
especially valuable for understanding privacy in non-spatial
dimensions.
But Solove's main objection appears to be that classifying matters
into either a private or a public sphere is overly reductive and possibly
misleading. 3 Solove appears to assume that acceptance of the private
sphere entails acceptance of a public sphere, as well as the notion that
items must be crammed into one or the other. Although the term
"public sphere" is also well known,84 the latter assumption is unfounded. As outlined below, the extent to which anything is private is
a matter of degree, but that complication by no means renders meaningless the classification of something as contained within the private
sphere. In fact, the account developed in this Article specifically provides for the possibility of matters remaining private to the world at
large even as select individuals have permission to access them.
II.

CONTROL OVER THE PRIVATE SPHERE AS A BUNDLE OF
RIGHTS

Section I distinguishes between privacy and privacy rights, and provides an outline of a view of the private sphere. This Section argues
that privacy rights should be understood as rights of control over the
private sphere that resemble rights of control over real property. In
developing this analysis, this Section highlights the underappreciated
extent to which specific and concrete elements of real-property law
can illuminate the intuitively appropriate contours of privacy
protections.

For the purposes of developing the analogy between privacy and
property, the following analysis treats property rights as a "bundle of
sticks" comprising several distinct sorts of rights. This is by no means
to suggest that the bundle-of-sticks view of property is free from controversy.8 5 It is, however, one dominant view that recommends itself
in the present context because it can accommodate the various entitlements necessary to confer the forms of control one reasonably needs
to be able to exercise over the private sphere to maintain a meaning83. Id.
84. Even the Carpenterdecision refers to the "public sphere." See Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2217 (2018).
85. See, e.g., Anna di Robilant, Property:A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REv. 869,
872-76 (2013) (describing an "impasse" between the "bundle-of-sticks" model and the "ownership" model, and then endorsing yet another model (the "tree model") of property); Larissa
Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTo L.J. 275, 276-80 (2008) (criticizing the "bundle-of-sticks" approach to understanding ownership and developing a competing
"exclusivity" model).
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ful level of privacy. Let us therefore assume, specifically, that realproperty ownership confers a bundle of rights, including the right to
exclude others from one's property, the right to alienate parts or all of
the property, and the right to use or enjoy the property.8 6 This cluster
reflects rights identified in prominent articulations of the bundle-ofsticks view.87 It also fits neatly with the intuitive range of privacy
rights we often accept, even if we do so at times under different
descriptions.
Some might think this entire exercise of rendering privacy rights on
a real-property model rests on a confusion or on a temptation to oversimplify privacy by imposing a spatial analysis on a (partially) nonspatial domain. Gavison has raised a version of that objection,88 as
have Solove8 9 and Lloyd Weinreb." Beyond the substantial theoretical fit explained above, however, there are compelling reasons for expecting some structural similarities between privacy and property,
especially given a view of privacy rights based on control over the
private domain. For one, privacy and real-property rights appear to
share theoretical roots. For example, some scholars have argued that
the notion of privacy is derived in some sense from the need to safeguard property:
[T]he need for a private sphere was both necessitated and facilitated
by the ownership of private property and the attendant necessity to
86. There are accounts of property ownership that include a bundle with even more sticks. As
noted below, some might consider A. M. Honor6's list of eleven "standard incidents of ownership" to be such an account. A. M. Honord, Ownership, in THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF LAW

370, 370 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993). It might be possible to map these incidents onto privacy, but
it may be less useful to do so. The value of the model is to graft the structure of the property
regime onto privacy for analytical purposes while preserving the flexibility necessary to account
for legitimate distinctions between property and privacy. A bundle like Honor6s, designed to go
beyond capturing the general structure of property ownership to describe "the incidents which
apply, in the ordinary case, to the person who has the greatest interest in the thing admitted by a
mature legal system," may take us (perhaps substantially) past the point of structural similarity.
Id.
87. See di Robilant, supra note 85, at 879-80 (describing Henry Terry's account of elementary
property rights as encompassing, among other rights, "the right to possess, use, and transfer" and
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's account as encompassing in part "the right that others may not
enter ... or cause physical harm to the land[;] an indefinite number of legal privileges of entering
the land, using the land, and harming the land[; and] the legal power to alienate [one's] legal
interest to another"). Hohfeld's account contains a fourth feature that refers to the property
owner's various "legal immunities, among which are the immunity that no ordinary person can
alienate" the owner's privileges. Id. Analogs of such immunities are likely compatible with the
account proposed here.
88. Gavison, supra note 12, at 425-28.
89. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 12, at 1131.
90. Weinreb claims that a spatial model for privacy "does not specify at all the shape or
dimensions of the space or what it contains[,]" and therefore "adds nothing, except by way of
metaphor. . . ." Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Right to Privacy, 17 Soc. PIu. & PoL'y 25, 34 (2000).
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safeguard and administer one's possessions. As the separation between what was "mine" and what was "yours" took on increasing
importance in the Renaissance era, the contours of personal identity
began to derive their shape from the nature of the individual's personal possessions, and it was in these possessions that a perceived
right of privacy came to reside. Additionally, the need to manage
property led to the emergence of the study as a place where the
householder could carry out his tasks in undisturbed contemplation
of his possessions and, in so doing, experience his own uniqueness.
Thus, the study "not only inaugurated the experience of a private
behavior but also nourished the apprehension of individual selfhood." Who one was, therefore, came to be a matter of what one
owned. Likewise, the quiet enjoyment of one's possessions came to
be viewed as a possessory right with which others could not interfere absent some overriding justification. Representing perhaps the
ultimate possession, as well as a shelter not only for the person but
also for all personal belongings, the home-and in a more narrow
sense the study-became a sacred, inviolate space where the householder could experience his selfhood to an extent not possible in
other settings.9 1
A historical link tracing the genesis of the notion of privacy to the
development of real-property conventions certainly could help explain
why the latter provides an intuitively appealing model for the former. 92 Even without such a link, however, control over real property-and especially over one's home-directly overlaps with an
element of control over the private sphere. Homes occupy a central
place in the private sphere, and accordingly they could be understood
qua property as being governed by the real-property regime and qua
private subdomain as being governed by a control account like the
one outlined in this Article. That fact also suggests a natural connection between real-property rights and privacy rights worth exploring.
To the extent that control over physical elements of the private domain resembles control over real property, theoretical simplicity
counts in favor of considering whether a similar model applies to nonphysical, private subdomains. Indeed, the structural affinity between
the real-property regime and the privacy regime is difficult to overlook on a control account of privacy rights. Like property rights, rights
in the private sphere appear to take the general form of rights in rem,
even if they are rights in a more abstract res.
Moreover, as noted above, our interests in both real property and in
privacy are varied and context-specific, but in comparable ways. Depending on the circumstances, it can be advantageous in either do91. Byford, supra note 48, at 32.
92. Perhaps a control account of privacy rights could even help to shed light on the relationship between the bundles of sticks in certain accounts of real-property rights.
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main to exclude people or to invite them in. A central interest in both
contexts also concerns deriving enjoyment of each respective domain
without undue interference. The multifaceted notion of control codified in real-property law therefore offers promise for privacy. And as
Section III makes clear, there are additional, manifest advantages to
the real-property model.
A.

The Right to Exclude

The right to exclude others from one's property is considered by
some to be the quintessential property right. For essentialists who are
skeptical of the bundle-of-sticks model of property rights, the right to
exclude stands as the salient candidate to bear the entire theoretical
heft of the property rights regime. One prominent formulation treats
the right to exclude as the right that owners have in real property. 9 3
On the view defended in this Article, the power to exclude others
from the private sphere also represents a key subset of privacy rights.
In fact, an essentialist account that accepts a sufficiently nuanced position on the right to exclude could still shed substantial light on privacy
and might even be fully capable of providing a model for privacy as
articulated here.94
In any case, in the context of the private sphere, the right to exclude
prevents unwanted intrusions in or trespasses upon our private matters. "Trespass" can take on a literal or metaphorical meaning, depending on whether the subdomain of the private sphere we are
discussing is physical or nonphysical. Nevertheless, the notion of a
metaphorical trespass is perfectly comprehensible. Although breaking
into someone's bedroom may be a trespass in the most literal sense
(on one's property rights as well as one's privacy), it is no less intuitive
to regard gaining inappropriate access to private information (in
whatever form-digital or physical, verbal or pictorial) as a trespass.
That is because the view defended here maps quite cleanly to the colloquial view of privacy rights as, inter alia, limiting nonconsensual access to matters that are our own business and not anyone else's.
The right to exclude others from the private sphere amounts to the
right to exercise a reasonable degree of control over who can "enter"
93. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 734
(1998) [hereinafter Merrill, Propertyand the Right to Exclude] (describing a version of essentialism attributed to Blackstone on which "the right to exclude ... is both a necessary and sufficient
condition of property").
94. For example, Merrill identifies a "multi-variable version of essentialism" that might accomplish this purpose. Id. at 736-37. But see di Robilant, supra note 85, at 879 (treating one of
Merrill's examples of a multi-variable essentialist-that of Honor6-as, in fact, a realist example
of the bundle-of-sticks view).
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the private sphere. There is room to quibble about the precise scope
of such control, but that is a matter we may set aside for present purposes. There are limitations on the right to exclude in the real-property context-for example, bans on discrimination in certain venues as
a matter of public policy 95-and some limitations are appropriate for
privacy as well. There are important ongoing debates about what
methods of exclusion are "reasonable" or otherwise acceptable, such
as the use of encryption to protect digital communications. 96 The key
point is that measures taken to secure one's private sphere, if reasonable, fall within the right to exclude.
The use of the term "reasonable" is also meant to capture the notion that one can "waive" protections for certain portions of the private sphere by rendering those portions public. That can be done
deliberately, alienating items in the private sphere (as discussed below), or it can be done inadvertently (if done sufficiently culpably, at
the very least). Again, disagreements exist about when someone might
have waived privacy protections for information, 9 7 but the essential
point is that it can cease to be "reasonable" to exclude people from
items that one has pushed outside of the private sphere. More specifically, publicizing information to a sufficient degree reduces or eliminates one's ability to exclude others from accessing it, whether
practically (because the information has become freely available) or
morally (because we have revealed an intention to permit others to
access it).
The analogy to property rights is perhaps most obvious in connection with the right to exclude. Excluding others from one's private
sphere is functionally similar to excluding others in the context of real
property. Absent special circumstances, to enter another's real property without permission is to commit the tort of trespass. It is for the
95. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 372 (1982) ("[T]he common law right to
exclude is substantially limited by a competing common law right of reasonable access to public
places."). Note that this particular holding offers a neat property analog to the notion that one's
right to exclude people from a matter that is prima facie private could be compromised if the
matter becomes sufficiently public.
96. See Dan Froomkin & Jenna McLaughlin, Comey Calls on Tech Companies Offering Endto-End Encryption to Reconsider "Their Business Model", INTERCEPr (Dec. 9, 2015, 10:48 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2015/12/09/comey-calls-on-tech-companies-offering-end-to-end-encryption-to-reconsider-their-business-modell (describing one such debate about end-to-end encryption between privacy advocates and then-FBI director James Comey).
97. For example, I have written elsewhere about this issue in connection with the human right
to privacy under the ICCPR. See G. Alex Sinha, Technology, Self-Inflicted Vulnerability and
Human Rights, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RiGH-s LAW AND PRACTICE 270 (Molly K.
Land & Jay D. Aronson eds., 2018). A prominent subject of debate in this connection is the
third-party doctrine, discussed below. See infra Section III.C.
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most part uncontroversial that if property rights provide for anything,
it is the right to exclude others. The same must be true of privacy.
Excluding others is the first assertion of control over a domain; lack of
the right to exclude vitiates meaningful control.
B.

The Right to Alienate

The right to alienate or transfer property is another stick in the classic bundle.9 8 Thomas Merrill describes this as derivative of the right to
exclude: The right to alienate is "an irrevocable agreement to give
permanent access to the resource to another combined with an irrevocable agreement to exclude oneself from access to the resource." 99
One could also alienate or transfer a subset rather than a complete set
of one's "aggregate of entitlements" in property.1oo Fundamentally,
however, someone cannot typically alienate or transfer another's
entitlements. 0 1
Likewise, regulating access to one's private sphere also requires the
reasonable power to alienate matters within that sphere. To alienate
something from the private sphere is simply to reveal it or relinquish
control over it to another, whether "it" is information, a dimension of
our bodies or minds, or any other element of the sphere. Note, of
course, that to alienate in this sense is not necessarily to extinguish our
own interest. One cannot transfer away one's private sphere to another with an irrevocable agreement to exclude oneself going forward.
We are inherently chained to our own private spheres in a manner
that is not true of any particular piece of property.
Although the effect can at times be the same, exercising the right to
alienate is significantly different from simply declining to exercise the
right to exclude someone from the private sphere. The latter depends
in the first instance on someone seeking entrance to one's sphere or
wandering in incidentally. By contrast, the right to alienate positively
empowers us to share private information or other items, and the
power to do that is extremely valuable. Bringing others into the
sphere is an essential tool for seeking advice or other assistance, building trust, developing intimacy, and so forth. Interference with our
right to alienate private matters would impede our ability to manage
our relationships effectively. In transferring power over private mat98. See discussion supra note 87 (describing accounts of property rights bundles from Terry
and Hohfeld).
99. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, supra note 93, at 743 (emphasis added).
100. di Robilant, supra note 85, at 881.
101. Id. (citing Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746 (1917)).
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ters to another, we can also create further private matters, such as
facts about a relationship with someone who has been granted the
right to enter our sphere.
Again, the analogy to real-property rights is both strong and analytically helpful. Suppose I want to share some sensitive information with
a friend-say, information about a medical diagnosis I have recently
received. I can provide that information to my friend and ask for her
advice on weighing treatment options, how to share the diagnosis with
my employer, and so on. In doing so, I give her access to some part of
my private sphere, much as I might lease her access to a guestroom.
Sharing this information does not amount to inviting her into every
corner of my private domain, no more than leasing the guestroom permits her to dig through the dresser in my own room. 10 2 Similarly, by
permitting my friend to learn of my diagnosis, I can stipulate that I am
not inviting all of my friends to learn of it. Again, the same is true in
real property; a landlord can reserve the power in a lease to regulate
whom the lessee can invite onto the property.1 03
C.

The Right to Use or Enjoy

In the property context, the right to use property may simply be
another way of expressing that one has the right to enjoy it.104 Under
one formulation or the other, that right is once more part of the classic
bundle.1 0 5 In essence, ownership over property includes the right to
make use of the property more or less as one sees fit (within reasonable limits). 1 0 6 Interferences with the right to use or enjoy one's prop-

erty are typically treated as "nuisances."
Similarly, we have the right to use or enjoy our respective private
spheres without undue interference. Restrictions on how we may conduct ourselves in private or utilize our privacy are equivalent to nuisances in the property context.10 7 Examples include laws governing
102. One area where privacy and real property diverge to some extent relates to revocation of
access that has been granted to others, addressed below. See infra Section III.D.
103. See Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, supra note 93, at 747-48.
104. See id. at 736 (arguing that the two formulations are "arguably redundant").
105. See discussion supra note 87.
106. See, e.g., Louis W. Hensler III, What's Sic Utere for the Goose: The Public Nature of the
Right to Use and Enjoy Property Suggests a UtilitarianApproach to Nuisance Cases, 37 N. Kv L.
REV. 31, 31 (2010) ("Owners may use land in many ways. For example, the owner may improve
the land and use it as a residence. Or the land may be used for recreation. Land can also serve
commercial purposes. All of these potential uses are encompassed within the owner's interest in
using and enjoying the property.").
107. Gavison rejects the notion that property nuisances like smells can constitute invasions of
privacy, arguing that "[t]here are no good reasons ... to expect any similarity between intrusive
smells or noises and modes of acquiring information about or access to an individual." Gavison,
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sexual behavior (such as laws banning sodomy), restrictions on the use
of contraceptives, and the like. Such restrictions do not necessarily
require the government to know anything about our private behavior,
and thus do not necessarily entail a privacy trespass. Instead, they
limit our liberty to engage in private conduct (that is, to "enjoy" our
private sphere). We can label impositions on the use or enjoyment of
subdomains properly identified per the analysis in Section I as privacy
nuisances. It is a separate question in any given instance whether such
a nuisance is defensible or justifiable as a policy matter.
The ability to rely on the privacy of certain matters is central to the
use and enjoyment of the private sphere, especially given the nearimpossibility of reclaiming full control over private information that
has been revealed. Activities that involve exploring unpopular ideas
or stigmatizing social interaction are only possible with some assurance that those matters will remain private from others to the reasonable extent that we wish it. Threats that chill such activities, especially
when the chilled response is justified, are nuisances as well. Surveillance provides a prime example. Knowledge that my correspondence
will or may be swept up by surveillance may (or even should) dissuade
me from expressing myself without reservation, impinging on my ability to undertake what (we can stipulate) is a legitimate, private exchange. That is different from sending correspondence with the belief
that it will remain private and then learning later that it was intercepted, which is a violation of the right to exclude and more akin to a
trespass.
Again, interferences with the private sphere that chill one's ability
to use or enjoy the sphere are not necessarily impermissible as a result. To return to the example above, the mere fact that a surveillance
program has a chilling effect may not render the program illegitimate
or unlawful (although that fact may be relevant). Just as in the case of
property rights, some limitations on the use and enjoyment of the private sphere may justify restrictions that would otherwise be impermissible as nuisances, especially where more than one person shares
access to private information.
D.

Competing Views of Control

The view outlined in this Section represents only one option for
how to define the role of control in an account of privacy and privacy
supra note 12, at 439. To the extent such nuisances can interfere with one's use or enjoyment of
the private sphere, the real-property model might yield a different conclusion. But more importantly, the prime candidates for privacy nuisances are forms of intrusive legislation that are nuisances in a more metaphorical sense.
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rights, though I believe it to be the strongest view. As alluded to
above, one might consider the possibility that privacy itself (rather
than privacy rights) is a matter of control. In A Definition of Privacy,
Richard B. Parker advances that view. Specifically, for Parker, privacy
"is control over when and by whom the various parts of us can be
sensed by others." 10 8 According to Parker, we lose control (and therefore privacy itself) when others obtain the power to sense us.
Perhaps the most illuminating example Parker provides concerns
someone who has a private conversation recorded at a party. 109 He
argues that "[w]hether the recording is ever replayed has no effect on
the degree of loss of privacy, for the loss consists not in being listened
to, but in losing control over when and by whom one is listened to." 110
In other words, once we lose the power to regulate the dissemination
of private information (or other access to a private domain), our privacy has been violated as to that information regardless of whether it is
actually disseminated.
This view is counterintuitive. Surely it matters a great deal for my
privacy interests whether a recording of my conversation is actually
played for people who are not supposed to hear it. Indeed, all else
equal, the more widely it is played, the greater the harm to me, and
the greater the intrusion on my privacy. That is not to say that the
recording does not violate my privacy, but Parker's account seems to
be missing something. Philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson makes a
similar observation in response to Parker. She writes:
[W]hy control? If my neighbor invents an X-ray device which enables him to look through walls, then I should imagine I thereby
lose control over who can look at me: going home and closing the
doors no longer suffices to prevent others from doing so. But my
right to privacy is not violated until my neighbor actually does train
the device on the wall of my house.111
Thomson's objection is exactly right, and it is certainly consistent with
the view laid out in Section I. Our privacy interests are constantly vulnerable to some extent, but that does not necessarily mean that we
regard them as harmed, or that we regard our privacy as infringed.
Although vulnerability figures into any adequate theory of privacy, it
simply cannot be the whole story. Parker may be picking up on the
idea that utter lack of control over the private sphere leaves us unable
to rely on our privacy.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Parker, supra note 22, at 281.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 283.
Thomson, supra note 12, at 305 n.1.
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Consider the example of homelessness, which sadly helps to reveal
the significance of the issue. 112 It might seem accurate to say that a
homeless person lacks privacy because she lacks reasonable control
over whether she is observed, but that is not right. A homeless person
on a deserted street may well have privacy, even if she does not know
it (because she does not know the street to be deserted) or cannot
protect it (because she has no walls or curtains to interpose between
her and passersby).1 13 It is better to say that her lack of a private
dwelling compromises her privacy rights and renders her vulnerable to
privacy violations because she lacks the reasonable resources to regulate entry into her private sphere when her street is not deserted. 114
There could therefore be a meaningful correlation between our level
of control over a private matter and our confidence that it is and will
remain private. But that is not a reason to think that control is the
touchstone for evaluating how much privacy we have, even as it shows
that control is undeniably relevant to a comprehensive discussion of
privacy.
The real-property model helps illuminate the trouble with Parker's
view. If we applied his view of privacy to the realm of real property,
Parker would be tracking something akin to the distinction between
owning a field and owning a fortress; our rights are similar in each
even as their respective vulnerability to certain forms of violation is
radically different. Perhaps our failure to take steps to protect our private information weakens our basis for complaining when that information is obtained, but that is not the same as claiming that

112. The example of homelessness suggests a strong actual-as opposed to merely theoretical-link between certain real-property rights and privacy rights. See infra Section III.B.
113. I take the view that someone living alone in an isolated area has an extremely high level
of privacy, even if she lacks shelter or other resources to keep out observers. Solove disagrees.
He claims that "a person stranded on a deserted island" is in "a state of isolation" rather than a
state of privacy. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 12, at 1104. By way of explanation,
he adds that "[p]rivacy involves one's relationship to society; in a world without others, claiming
that one has privacy does not make much sense." Id That may well be true of a world without
other people; if only one person exists, the notion of privacy may not be particularly useful. A
deserted island in a crowded world is a perfectly valid thought experiment for assessing the reach
of a theory of privacy, however, and, even granting Solove's assumption, it is not the same as a
world without people.
114. There may be conventions for speaking about privacy that do not align with this analysis
but that can be explained as a matter of casual imprecision. Suppose you and I are walking down
the street, and you ask me to reveal to you some secret I have been keeping. I might reply, "This
is not a private spot." That statement could be accurate in a literal sense, if there are others
around. Or, if others are not present or at least not visible, my response could be elliptical for,
"This spot may appear private for the moment, but we cannot be sure that it is; and even if we
knew it to be private right now, we could not trust that it would remain so."
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information unknown to others is not private simply because others
could obtain it.
On the view defended here, my rights to exclude others from my
private domain are not violated simply because others have the actual
(non-legal) power to intrude; they are violated when others actually
do intrude. In this context, my right to control my private domain
means I am wronged if my neighbor peers through my walls without
my consent, and I should be entitled to seek a remedy if she does so.
Merely owning an X-ray machine is no more a violation of a neighbor's privacy than owning a wrecking ball is a violation of a neighbor's
real-property rights.
We should reject Parker's view that privacy itself is a matter of control. That view is still helpful for illuminating some advantages of the
real-property model, however. Suppose we treat Parker's view as a
view of privacy rights instead. The view would be that privacy rights
are rights of "control over when and by whom the various parts of us
can be sensed by others."11 5 This is closer to the mark in some respects, as it identifies the proper level at which control is relevant, but
it still cannot be right.
On this modified version of Parker's view, privacy rights would protect a private sphere comprising "various parts of us." Based on
Parker's party example, that phrase would cover eavesdropping on
private conversations-not just access to our bodies, as the language
might imply. Leaving aside questions about the contents of this version of the private sphere, it is apparent that the view is overly broad.
Suppose that, without my permission, someone records a conversation
with me. Depending on our view of control over the private sphere,
that could be a violation of my privacy. But suppose I consent to that
person's recording of the conversation subject to the qualification that
the recording is not to be played for anyone who was not party to the
conversation. I have still lost power over the recording because it is
not in my custody, but, presumably because I consented to it, that loss
of power is not a violation of my privacy. Crucially, my qualification
preserves my rights in the information on the recording even though I
have traded away the physical power to protect the information. At
that point, there would be a violation of my privacy vis-A-vis the tape
only if my interlocutor plays the recording for a third party. But that
violation would not occur at the moment that I lost physical power
over the contents of the conversation; it would occur only when the
tape is played.
115. Parker, supra note 22, at 281.
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More generally, it is difficult to conceive of a right to control anything that is violated merely because others have the physical power to
harm the interest it protects. Indeed, any right that hinges on the literal inability of anyone else to infringe it is superfluous by definition.
Parker's broad view of control, whether used to define privacy or privacy rights, misidentifies the location of the link between privacy violations and harms. The form of control captured by the real-property
model overcomes this problem.
III.

KEY IMPLICATIONS OF THE REAL-PROPERTY MODEL OF
PRIVACY

Collectively, the rights to exclude, alienate, and use or enjoy capture the variety of rights we need to exert reasonable control over our
respective private spheres-specifically by policing the boundaries
and inner workings of our spheres. 1 16 Any privacy violation should be
cognizable as fitting into one of these categories. On the view defended in this Article, privacy can be viewed as a form of capital for
the exercise of human agency. 117 Depending on the circumstances, it
can be advantageous to retain and make use of it directly or to trade it
away in exchange for some other advantage. The power to make decisions about which path to pursue in any given instance is an incredibly
significant component of the exercise of human agency. Moreover,
losing the power to regulate or protect the boundaries of the private
sphere does not necessarily entail that items in the private sphere
cease to be private, but their status as private becomes immediately
more tenuous. Depending on how much of that form of control is lost,
the privacy of parts of the sphere may become so vulnerable that one
can no longer rely on those parts to remain private. The inability to
rely on matters remaining private can, under many conditions, eliminate much of the benefit of privacy.
The real-property regime provides an extremely useful heuristic device for understanding and assessing these rights. As noted above, the
theoretical similarities between privacy and real property do not appear simply by coincidence; the notion of understanding privacy rights
on a real-property model suggests itself in part because the two concepts appear to share a historical link and because real property can
116. This suggests that the core sticks in the bundle typically associated with property rights
are of significance at a deeper theoretical level than might typically be acknowledged.
117. This formulation closely mirrors a common understanding of property rights on a "bundle of sticks account." See, e.g., di Robilant, supra note 85, at 871 (describing this view of property rights as "a bundle of entitlements regulating relations among persons concerning a valued
resource").
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itself be so important for protecting a subset of our privacy interests.
Beyond theoretical fit, there are further key advantages to (and certain notable neutral implications of) embracing the analogy and
adopting a real-property model for privacy.
A.

The Real-Property Model of Privacy Simplifies the Privacy
Analysis in Complex Domains, such as Cyberspace

Perhaps because we have privacy interests in so many disparate
types of items-whether our minds, our bodies, our data, or our real
or personal property-conceptualizing and protecting privacy can
seem impossibly complex. That complexity presents us with several
choices as we attempt to make sense of privacy and its protections.
First, we can accept the complexity at face value and cobble together a
legal regime designed to protect the various separate strands. That approach may be appropriate if we conclude that there is no common
idea linking the different interests we regard as "private." Of course, if
no common theme to privacy interests is apparent, binding them together will seem ad hoc. To the extent protecting such ostensibly different interests may require different mechanisms, the right to privacy
threatens to splinter and dissolve into a clump of loosely-related or
entirely unrelated interests.1 18
A second possibility is to adopt a narrower model of which matters
are private (and therefore a more manageable view of what privacy
protects). If privacy itself is less complicated as a concept-say, because it only protects information and not activities 119-it could well
become less complicated to understand and to protect.
The view defended here represents a third possibility. First, we let
the private sphere be as widely encompassing as it needs to be to capture our jurisprudence about ostensible privacy violations or our intuitions about what matters are private. Then, we unify the diverse subdomains within the private sphere by reference to a single, overarching interest. Finally, we conceptualize violations of privacy rights on a
model that renders intrusions on widely disparate types of protected
matters in broadly similar terms. Real-property rights provide the
power to conceptualize privacy in just such a manner.
118. Thomson adopts some form of this view, concluding that privacy does not cohere as a
unitary concept. See generally Thomson, supra note 12.
119. For example, one could take Marmor's view discussed above, on which privacy only concerns how we present ourselves to others. See generally Marmor, supra note 12. That view still
manifests numerous complexities, but the less capacious underlying view of privacy simplifies the
task of understanding and protecting privacy rights.
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One particularly important feature of the approach defended here
is that it simplifies privacy at a time when privacy badly needs simplification. The current landscape poses particular challenges above and
beyond the inherent complexities of privacy. The combination of
rapid technological development and the growing and often uninformed adoption of digital technologies by the public makes it extremely difficult for most technology users to understand their own
privacy vulnerabilities, let alone adopt protective measures. Few are
equipped to handle these challenges, even among those who have substantial resources and every incentive to overcome impediments to
protecting their privacy. 1 2 0 It is easy to let these practical realities
muddle our theoretical commitments.
There are two key ways in which the real-property model simplifies
privacy. First, it is intuitively accessible, especially in relation to leading alternatives. The ubiquity of the notion of the private sphere is a
major indicator of its accessibility. Moreover, the property heuristic
allows us to visualize the private domain and privacy violations on a
model that applies to tangible reality. Obviously, violations of realproperty rights such as trespasses and nuisances are especially easy to
visualize because they pertain to a physical domain. 12 1 We can literally
see real property and its boundaries, and we can picture intrusions.
Being able to visualize privacy in the same way, even if metaphorically, serves an essential function that becomes apparent when one
contemplates other available models.
For example, Solove has defended an approach that "conceptualizes
privacy within particular contexts rather than in the abstract." 12 2 The
purpose of this approach is to "aid in solving problems, assessing costs
and benefits, and structuring social relationships."1 2 3 But Solove deliberately avoids attempting to "describe the sum and substance of privacy," as I have done above. As a result, his approach yields more
amorphous results. He essentially concludes that privacy serves different functions in different contexts, and that perceived violations disrupt particular practices. Because Solove provides little more
120. See generally G. Alex Sinha, With Liberty to Monitor All: How Large-Scale US Surveillance Is HarmingJournalism, Law, and American Democracy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM.

C.L. UNION (July 28, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usnsa07l4_ForUP
load_0.pdf [hereinafter Sinha, With Liberty to Monitor All] (illustrating that journalists and lawyers with professional obligations to protect the privacy of their sources and clients, respectively,
struggle substantially nevertheless).
121. That is not to say that property law is itself straightforward. Plainly, many elements are
not. Many law students will recall with dread the experience of attempting to master the Rule
Against Perpetuities, for example.
122. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 12, at 1129.
123. Id.
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guidance on what privacy is at a fundamental level, his approach has
much less normative force than a fulsome account of privacy tied to an
account of its fundamental value. More to the point, unlike the realproperty model, his does not provide an intuitive basis (or really any
basis) for clearly conceiving of one's privacy or imagining what falls
within it.
Or consider a model developed by Helen Nissenbaum, according to
which "privacy is a right to appropriate flow of information." 12 4 On
her view, the basis for our concerns about "contemporary systems and
practices of information gathering, aggregation, analysis, and dissemination is not that they diminish our control and pierce our secrecy, but
that they transgress context-relative informational norms." 125 Her
view is therefore pegged to our perceptions of the propriety of information flows in light of the norms that govern the particular context in
which a given privacy question arises. Whatever the merits of this approach, it is most assuredly not as intuitively accessible as the realproperty model. The norms at the heart of this "contextual integrity"
approach "are characterized by four key parameters: contexts, actors,
attributes, and transmission principles." 1 2 6 The application of the
model to evaluate a given system or practice involves nine distinct
steps. 127 The number of moving parts in this approach renders it unable to provide the ex ante visual or intuitive clarity of the real-property
model.
The second respect in which the real-property model simplifies privacy is that it is able to accommodate technological developments
while also remaining conceptually stable. 12 8 The model renders the
protected interests on the same plane and brings into focus the questions we need to ask about ostensible violations. The various ways in
which one can violate another's privacy, such as by eavesdropping on
them, barring them from sharing their private matters with their loved
ones, or restricting the uses of their bodies, all have one thing in common: They are interferences with a domain that everyone possesses
and is entitled to govern.
It does not matter that some of these intrusions do not involve
crossing a physical boundary. In fact, nowhere is this analogy more
helpful than in complicated, non-spatial domains like cyberspace. As
124. NISSENBAUM, supra note 20, at 127 (emphasis omitted).

125. Id. at 186.
126. Id. at 140.
127. See id. at 181-83 (elaborating on each step).
128. Nissenbaum claims that her view is designed for a similar, albeit narrower, purposenamely, "for evaluating in moral and political terms the myriad new technology-based systems
and practices radically affecting the flow of personal information." Id. at 158.
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noted above, some theorists are especially skeptical that a spatial metaphor can make sense of a non-spatial domain. 12 9 As one has written:
In view of the very nature of cyberspace-its lack of physical characteristics, its unboundedness, and its independence of material
contingencies-traditional Western conceptualizations of privacy
clearly do not translate easily into this new environment. A territorial view of privacy, which associates the concept of privacy with the
sanctity of certain physical spaces, has no application in a realm in
which there is no space. 130
The analysis in Sections I and II suggests this passage is mistaken.
Perhaps the point would be compelling if our aim were to visualize the
whole of cyberspace as a physical domain. But all we need to do is
visualize each person as the center of a private domain-a domain
that cuts across certain elements of both the material and immaterial
world. Each person's mind and body, as well as some of their property
and information, will fall within that domain. Whether some of that
information is stored in digital form does not seriously complicate the
analysis. What places the information within a person's private domain is not a matter of whether it is in transit in packet form over
fiber optic cables, stored in a server across an ocean, or saved to a
flash drive in a person's home (although the flash drive might also be
protected as private personal property). 131 The boundaries of the private sphere depend simply on the nature of the information and
whether the person has waived protections for it.
This is a particular virtue of adopting and embracing the spatial
metaphor for privacy. Cyberspace has bedeviled privacy advocates because it is difficult for many people to understand. Even highly-educated Internet users often render sensitive data vulnerable online in
ways that simply seem stupid in retrospect. 132 And Internet users continue to find their private data exposed in ways they did not realize
was possible1 33 or did not anticipate.1 34 By and large, it is much more
129. See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 12, at 1131-32 (expressing this concern
and citing Byford in support).
130. Byford, supra note 48, at 40.
131. For a detailed discussion of the challenges posed by attempting to identify the physical
location of data, see Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territorialityof Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326 (2015).
For a contrary view, see Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REv.
729 (2016).
132. See, e.g., Erica Fink & Laurie Segall, Government Workers Cope with Fallout from
Ashley Madison Hack, CNN (Aug. 22, 2015, 11:28 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/22/technology/ashley-madison-hack-government-workers/ (describing the consequences suffered by
government workers who were discovered to have used their official email addresses to register
with a website that facilitated extramarital affairs).
133. See CambridgeAnalytica and Facebook- The Scandal and the FalloutSo Far, N.Y. TIMEs
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fall-
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difficult to grasp the security of one's data online than it is to understand its security in physical form, even as the use of digital technologies and the proportion of our data stored in digital form has
exploded. By focusing on the relationship between a person and her
data, it is possible to render questions about digital privacy structurally identical to questions about physical privacy. We can also sidestep
fruitless efforts to map out cyberspace itself, as well as approaches
that fundamentally and unrealistically require a populace with a better
grasp of digital technologies.
B.

Both Theoretical Fit and Enforceability Count in Favor of the
Real-Property Model of Privacy

On the account defended here, privacy rights are extremely important because they play a central role in advancing one of our strongest
interests as agents. The rationale behind them extends to more or less
3 5 As a theoeveryone as well, for privacy rights are universal rights.s
retical matter, that position lines up with societal practice. Whether
understood as human rights or constitutional rights, privacy rights are
not limited in any significant way to a subset of the population based
on age, sex, class, or any other demographic division.1 3 6
One important consideration in selecting a model for privacy rights
must be that it helps to cognize violations of those rights in a manner
that reflects the seriousness of their violation. The real-property regime is extremely effective in this respect, as it offers owners powerful
tools to enforce their rights to possession of their land-especially
when they suffer trespasses. "Generally speaking, when the intrusion
is governed by trespass, then there is no exception for de minimis
harms, a rule of strict liability applies, and the landholder can obtain
an injunction to prevent future invasions."1 3 7 Courts will typically
out.html (providing a summary of the Times' coverage of the scandal, in which Cambridge
Analytica gained improper access to the private data of tens of millions of Facebook users and
used it in an attempt to influence the U.S. elections, including the 2016 presidential election).
134. See Donna Borak & Kathryn Vasel, The Equifax Hack Could Be Worse than We
Thought, CNN (Feb. 10, 2018, 10:43 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/09/pf/equifax-hacksenate-disclosure/index.html (discussing the massive scope of the 2017 hack of national credit
bureau Equifax, which affected nearly 150 million people).
135. By tying privacy interests to agency, the account defended here invites questions about
the privacy interests held by those with diminished capacities, such as people who are particularly young, old, or disabled in certain respects. I tend to think privacy simply does play a somewhat less pronounced role for people with limited agency, although it will remain very important
in all but the most extreme cases.
136. There are limited exceptions, such as age-based differences that allow adults to control
certain private matters for minor children or others of limited capacity.
137. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of DeterminingProperty Rights, 14
J. LEGAL STrUES 13, 13 (1985) [hereinafter Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Deter-
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award nominal damages for a trespass even if no actual damages are
demonstrated. 13 8 And intentional or knowing trespass often results in
multiple statutory damages. 139 Moreover, trespass covers intrusions by
tangible objects generally (like animals, vehicles, rocks, and so forth),
rather than just people. 140
The availability of remedies is therefore yet another reason to favor
a real-property model for privacy. Importing property-style remedies
to the realm of privacy is appropriate given the importance of privacy
protections. Beyond the normative argument provided in this Article
to support the notion that privacy ought to be more strictly protected,
recent developments also suggest a public mood that is open to such a
shift. For example, in July of 2018, Facebook set a record when it suffered the largest single-day drop in its stock value of any publiclytraded company in history. 141 Facebook's "privacy missteps"-including its failure to provide adequate protection for users' data-contributed significantly to its catastrophic day on Wall Street.1 42 Thus,
although certain rules may require limited modification-such as a
strict liability standard for trespassesl 43-the influence of the property
regime in this respect is promising.
Moreover, because of the structural similarity between privacy (on
the view defended here) and property, the forceful rules of the property regime carry over well by analogy. For example, that any tangible
object can yield a trespass in the property context offers a compelling
analogy for the notion that a privacy trespass can be effected by the
nonconsensual collection of private data by a computer-even if the
data are never shared with another human, as in various forms of national security surveillance conducted by the government.1 44 The collection of such data by a non-sentient intruder still interferes with our
mining Property Rights]. Of course, in the property context, the law is somewhat less helpful for
victims of nuisances. See generally id. (comparing remedies for trespass and nuisance).
138. Id. at 18.
139. Id. at 18 n.26.
140. Id at 14.
141. Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, How Year of Privacy ControversiesFinally Caught
up with Facebook, WASI-. POST (July 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2018/07/26/how-years-privacy-controversies-finally-caught-up-with-facebook/?
utm-term=.4dbdae755c26. Facebook's value dropped by over $100 billion dollars. Id.
142. Id. (describing "a world in which public pressure is mounting for stricter privacy
protections").
143. See infra Section II1.D.
144. See, e.g., Ashley Gorski & Patrick Toomey, Unprecedented and Unlawful: The NSA's
'Upstream' Surveillance, AM. C.L. UNION (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/nationalsecurity/privacy-and-surveillance/unprecedented-and-unlawful-nsas-upstream.
For additional
background on NSA surveillance, see generally G. Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and
the Human Right to Privacy, 59 Loy. L. REv. 861 (2014).
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sole possession of the private sphere, and constitutes a privacy trespass. Similarly, the computerized scanning of personal messagessuch as Google's practice of scanning the text of Gmail users' emails
for the purpose of displaying targeted ads-most assuredly implicates
the users' privacy. 1 4 5
Similarly, the aggregation of data poses a growing privacy problem
in the digital age. It has become faster and cheaper to assemble semipublic pieces of information about a person to paint a revealing picture that would be largely invisible otherwise. 146 The practice is analogically similar to a "'constructive' interference with exclusive
possession" of a piece of real property, where a nonactionable, minor
interference can become so severe that it is treated as a trespass. 1 4 7
Once data aggregation reaches a critical mass-because it begins to
reveal protected details, for example-it effectively interferes with the
subject's power to exclude others from the private sphere.
Borrowing from a potent rights regime is all the more important
because privacy rights are not distributed equally across the population. Privacy has become expensive. 1 4 8 It can be time-consuming or
nearly impossible to secure in the digital era. 149 And, in some respects,
it is also distributed inequitably across race and class as a matter of
government policy, as evidenced by enormous racial disparities in police searches of citizens.1 50 In fact, modeling privacy rights on real145. The acceptabilityof the practice may ultimately turn on the validity of users' consent, but
the model implies that the practice at minimum implicates users' privacy.
146. See K. A. Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 123, 176 (2005) (discussing the problem).
147. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, supra note
137, at 30.
148. See Julia Angwin, Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 3, 2014),
(arguing
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/opinion/has-privacy-become-a-luxury-good.html
that protecting one's privacy has become expensive and difficult); Amanda Hess, How Privacy
Became a Commodity for the Rich and Powerful, N.Y. TiMEs (May 9, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/05/09/magazine/how-privacy-became-a-commodity-for-the-rich-and-powerful.ht
ml (same).
149. See generally Sinha, With Liberty to Monitor All, supra note 120.
150. See Kia Makarechi, What the Data Really Says About Police and Racial Bias, VANITY
FAIR (July 14, 2016, 3:09 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/07/data-police-racial-bias
(summarizing findings from various studies suggesting that police disproportionately stop and
search racial minorities, especially African Americans or Hispanics, in San Francisco, California;
Ferguson, Missouri; Chicago, Illinois; Greensboro, North Carolina; New York, New York; and
Maricopa County, Arizona); see also Al Baker, New York Minorities More Likely to be Frisked,
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/nyregion/13frisk.html ("Blacks
and Latinos were nine times as likely as whites to be stopped by the police in New York City in
2009, but, once stopped, were no more likely to be arrested."); N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., Racial
Discrimination in Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/
13/opinion/racial-discrimination-in-stop-and-frisk.htmi (noting that New York City conducted an
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property rights brings the inequality of privacy rights into relief in one
of the sharpest ways possible, both because real-property rights also
belong disproportionately to the privileged1 5 1 and because property
rights serve as a proxy for an especially important subset of privacy
rights.
Control over a physical space, such as a house or an apartment,
provides the basis for part-though only part-of a reasonable private
sphere. It offers a physical domain (protected in part by privacy law,
such as the Fourth Amendment, but also by standard property rights)
in which agents can store personal property and information, develop
and pursue intimate relationships, explore controversial ideas, engage
in unpopular activities, express emotions and thoughts without inviting the judgment of others, and generally exert some measure of control over the terms on which they engage with the world. Owning real
property thus empowers agents both directly to the extent it confers
certain privacy rights (say, if one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property in question), and indirectly through property
rights. Those wealthy enough to own more property, or to own more
secure property, can thus experience significant privacy-related advan"astounding 4.4 million stops between January 2004 and June 2012. Of these, only 6 percent
resulted in arrests and 6 percent resulted in summonses. In other words, 88 percent of the 4.4
million stops resulted in no further action-meaning a vast majority of those stopped were doing
nothing wrong. More than half of all people stopped were frisked, yet only 1.5 percent of frisks
found weapons. In about 83 percent of cases, the person stopped was black or Hispanic, even
though the two groups accounted for just over half the population."); Anthony M. DeStefano,
Stop-and-Frisk Encounters Down 50% but Minorities Still Stopped More, Stats Show, NEWSDAY
(July 28, 2015, 8:57 PM), http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/nypd-stop-and-frisk-encoun
("NYPD officers conters-down-50-but-minorities-still-stopped-more-stats-show-1.10685785
ducted nearly 50 percent fewer stop-and-frisk encounters in the first quarter of this year than
they did in 2014, but the percentage of minorities stopped was still greater than 80 percent, close
to the level reported in previous quarters, the latest statistics show."); Justice Department Announces Findings of Investigation into Baltimore Police Department, U.S. DEP'T OF JusT. (Aug.
10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/justice-department-announces-findings-investigationbaltimore-police-department (alleging, inter alia, that "BPD makes stops, searches and arrests
without the required justification [and] uses enforcement strategies that unlawfully subject African Americans to disproportionate rates of stops, searches and arrests").
151. For example, census data show that rates of home ownership vary massively by race. See
Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.16, https://www.census.gov/
housing/hvs/data/histtabs.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (showing that, dating back to 1994,
homeownership rates among Whites have stood at about 70-75%, whereas homeownership by
African Americans fluctuated between 40-50%). Similar statistics hold across different social
classes. Id. at tbl.17 (showing that, dating back to 1994, homeownership rates among Americans
with above-median family incomes have hovered around 80% and those with below-median
incomes have remained around 50%). Non-homeowners may still hold real-property rights in
some form, but those rights will likely be weaker (for example, if they rent their homes instead
of owning). In any event, to the extent that real property is a valuable asset, it is plainly more
accessible to the wealthy.
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tages. Such disparities warrant attention especially because it cannot
be taken for granted that they are normatively justifiable.
In short, the real-property model supports the adoption of powerful
remedies for privacy violations and offers resources for explaining
why certain practices that seem intuitively problematic ought, in fact,
to be treated like privacy violations. Moreover, the fundamental significance of privacy (combined with the unequal distribution of privacy rights) points to yet another reason for adopting the model: The
protections afforded for privacy should, to the extent practical, be at
least as strong as the protections for property.
C.

The Real-Property Model of Privacy Explains Intuitive
Misgivings About the Third-Party Doctrine

The third-party doctrine essentially states that "a person cannot
have a reasonable expectation of privacy [for Fourth Amendment purposes] in information disclosed to a third party." 1 5 2 The rule, which
has been established and refined through a number of significant
court decisions, applies to the "collection of evidence from third parties in criminal investigations." 1 5 3 The cases that establish the rule
generally involve the use of information provided by government informants or agents, or the use of third-party business records.1 54 The
Supreme Court arguably narrowed the third-party doctrine in its recent Carpenter decision, discussed above.15 5 There, the Court explicitly stated that the proper application of the third-party doctrine must
account for the nature of the data being conveyed to a third party, and
it declined to "extend[ the rule's logic] to the qualitatively different
category of cell-site records." 1 5 6
Even before Carpenter, the doctrine had its defenders, 15 7 though it
has also come under growing scrutiny in light of technological advancements that render it increasingly difficult for individuals to manage their affairs without providing sensitive information to third-party
152. Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Micti. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009)
[hereinafter Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine].
153. Id.
154. See id. at 567-70 (discussing the cases).
155. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); see also supra text accompanying
notes 1-10.
156. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216-17. The Court argued that knowingly conveying information to a third party might diminish one's expectation of privacy in that information, but does not
necessarily eliminate it-especially when the information concerns a matter "[t]he Court has . ..
already shown special solicitude," such as detailed information about one's location over an
extended period. Id. at 2219. The Court also noted that CSLI "is not truly 'shared' as one normally understands the term." Id. at 2220.
157. See generally Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 152.
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service providers.1 58 And the doctrine stands. The CarpenterCourt explicitly avoided "disturbing the application" of the third-party doctrine to the facts of its foundational cases on the subject.1 5 9 Although
Carpenterprovides some reassurance, the fundamental premise of the
doctrine is arguably minatory for privacy rights not only because it
controversially limits Fourth Amendment protection for certain data,
but also because it conditions the public to hesitate to share those
data. The typical articulation of the rule invites the common objection
that the provision of information to a third party does not necessarily
render an expectation of privacy in that information unreasonable.
For whatever the objection is worth, that is perfectly true. We often
convey private information to others on the expectation that the information will not be disseminated further. 160
That objection carries more force if we adopt the view of privacy as
a matter of control over a domain: Analogous control over a domain
in the real-property context does not admit of the same sort of dilution of one's power to exclude the State. Permitting the entry of visitors into one's home is not tantamount to consenting to a State search
of one's home even if one is under criminal investigation, for there is
no real-property analogy to the third-party doctrine. 16 1 The same is
true with personal property. As Justice Gorsuch points out in his Carpenter dissent, the law recognizes that we may maintain our interest in
personal property that we have entrusted to another for a specific purpose (an arrangement known as a bailment). 16 2 The asymmetry between property and privacy rights may result because the Fourth
Amendment test is cashed out in terms of expectations of privacy,
158. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
("More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.") (internal citations
omitted).
159. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
160. The leaking of information from a party with permission to possess it to a party that lacks
such permission is a particularly tricky issue, however. See infra Section III.D.
161. Kerr draws an analogy between providing information to a third party and sharing a
home with a third party as co-occupants. Kerr, The Case for the Third-PartyDoctrine, supra note
152, at 589. In each case, he argues, we give control over information or property (respectively)
to a third party, who can then consent to its search by police. Id. By treating any third party to
whom we have given information as equivalent to a cohabitant in a home, Kerr's comparison
elides the possibility that someone to whom we have given information should be analogized to a
mere visitor in one's home-someone who cannot pass on consent to a search on our behalf. The
latter analogy is more appropriate in a number of contexts.
162. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268-69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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whereas real-property rights are not.1 63 But, per the account defended
here, control over the private domain should be understood in the
same way as control over property. That model would drastically constrict the third-party doctrine, at the very least limiting it to cases
where a third party has independent authority to provide the State
with access to contested information.
D.

On the Real-Property Model of Privacy, the Most Difficult
Questions Arise Where Property and Privacy Are
Dissimilar

It should go without saying that difficult questions will remain on a
real-property model of privacy. It should also go without saying that
real-property rights and privacy rights are different in respects that
must be accommodated by the model. Rights in a purely physical domain differ significantly from rights in a partially non-physical domain, not least in terms of discerning violations and actually enforcing
the proper boundaries. And, of course, real-property rights are not
exclusively about privacy; it is possible to acquire real property with
no interest at all in the attendant privacy protections. Real-property
law is designed to serve those sorts of interests as well, if not first and
foremost. 164
This latter observation points to a key difference between realproperty rights and privacy rights: Subject to the limitations of a person's material resources, someone can acquire (and relinquish) as
many pieces of real property as she likes, but she only has one private
sphere. Our respective private spheres will generally accrete items
over our lives, growing as our persistence across time continuously
creates new facts about our present selves and accumulates more facts
about our past selves. But each of us only has one private sphere,
intrinsically anchored by proximity to our agency, and our relationship
to the sphere will remain of massive normative significance.
As discussed above, real property can serve as an essential element
of the private sphere, particularly when the property in question is
incorporated into our lives in a central way. Some real property is
likely to matter a great deal for nearly everyone's privacy. But the link
163. Of course, the consent of a co-occupant to the search of a shared space is also to be
understood in terms of a reasonable expectation of privacy; that is a privacy rule applied to real
property. By contrast, the third-party doctrine is a privacy rule applied to information. If anything, the fact that these different standards both derive from the Fourth Amendment helps
underscore the difference between the treatment of information and property under the Fourth
Amendment, which is suggestive of a flaw in Kerr's analogy.
164. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 46 (identifying some such interests).
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between privacy and real property is contingent on our use of the real
property in question. A real estate speculator may possess a dozen
loci of real-property rights, but few of them will likely serve the sorts
of interests identified in Section I. This fundamental difference reminds us that privacy rights and real-property rights are not on the
same plane of moral importance, even if they can overlap in certain
circumstances.
There is a second, particularly salient difficulty on a real-property
model of privacy: Interpreting the potential privacy violations that accompany the disclosure of private information from one party with
permission to access it to other parties who lack such permission. In
many respects, privacy is a one-way ratchet. Relinquishing control
over private matters by revealing those matters to others, or having
that control wrested from us against our will (say, by spying or theft),
dilutes our power over the domain. Private information becomes less
private once shared, and our power to keep it private diminishes accordingly. Once private information becomes partially or fully public,
it is difficult or impossible to claw it back. Private facts are like cats;
they can be impossible to recapture once let out of the bag. Losing the
ability to stop private information from becoming public can therefore
be deeply disconcerting and disempowering.16 5
Real-property rights are arguably more discrete, especially when
compared to the control of private information. One can be granted
temporary permission to cross a physical boundary (say, a license to
come over to dinner). Because we cannot compel others to forget,
however, it is not generally possible to grant another temporary permission to know a piece of information. Additionally, certain information is easy to disseminate casually or carelessly, whether through
routine conversation or correspondence-and, crucially, without any
action on the part of the recipient. If I tell you a secret that I had no
business repeating, I have dragged you into a small part of someone
else's private sphere. 166 By contrast, barring the use of physical force,
165. Note that, in Europe, courts have recognized "the right to be forgotten," which allows
certain complainants to claw back information from the public domain that they wish to treat as
private. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion (offering some history on the development of the right to be forgotten).
166. As discussed above, Parker denies that this sort of leak gives rise to an additional privacy
violation. See Parker, supra note 22, at 283 (articulating the view that further dissemination of
stolen private information does not yield additional privacy violations). By contrast, Rachels
shares the view defended here. See Rachels, supra note 12, at 333 ("Suppose you are recently
divorced, and the reason your marriage failed is that you became impotent shortly after the
wedding. You have shared your troubles with your closest friend, but this is not the sort of thing
you want everyone to know. Not only would it be humiliating for everyone to know, it is none of
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I can invite you to trespass on another's property but no trespass is
actually effected absent an affirmative act by you to step over the
boundary. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that it can be challenging to identify what information is private and therefore protected. Again, that is less an issue with real property, except to the
extent that someone's private property is poorly marked. Each of
these dissimilarities poses certain distinctive challenges, but collectively we might call this the problem of iterating trespasses: Informational privacy trespasses beget further trespasses.
CONCLUSION

To accept a real-property model for privacy is to acknowledge the
questions raised in the previous section, which are theoretically difficult. At the same time, the implications of these questions for the
value of the model defended here are limited. Many private matters
are not difficult to identify (or, at least, will not be on a fuller account
of the private domain), and many forms of interference with privacy
remain straightforward. The real-property model can clearly accommodate major categories of interferences that an account should be
able to capture, such as hacking, identity theft, surveillance, improper
forms of physical contact, and so forth. The difficulties apply primarily
to marginal cases that would pose a challenge to more or less any
model.
Even for those harder cases, like those that raise questions about
iterating trespasses, it is possible to sidestep some of the challenges
when it comes to the practical matter of actually enforcing privacy
rights. One promising solution is to set default rules for demarcating
the private sphere. For example, we can (and in some contexts already
do) designate certain categories of information, like health information, as prima facie private, eliminating guesswork about whether certain information can be shared down the line without the consent of
the subject. We should also adopt modified liability rules: Trespass on
the private domain might not be assessed on a strict-liability basis
given the various ways in which one can be dragged faultlessly into
another's private sphere. Liability for such a privacy violation should
require an affirmative act by the trespasser or a culpable mental state.
their business. It is the sort of intimate fact about you that is not appropriate for strangers or
casual acquaintances to know. But now the gossips have obtained the information (perhaps one
of them innocently overheard your discussion with your friend; it was not his fault, so he did not
violate your privacy in the hearing, but then you did not know he was within earshot) and now
they are spreading it around to everyone who knows you and to some who do not. Are they
violating your right to privacy? I think they are.").
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In any event, whatever solutions we adopt, they may well be easier to
conceptualize on a model of privacy rights that embraces an explicit
analogy to physical space. 167
Ultimately, the differences between privacy and property do not undermine the utility of the real-property model of privacy. The model
does more than accommodate key intuitions about how to understand
privacy rights. It also offers theoretical clarity across various private
subdomains, underscores the significant moral weight of privacy
rights, and allows us to approach remaining theoretical challenges
through an analogy to a similar and well-developed rights regime. The
real-property model of privacy provides a promising mechanism for
interpreting a complex and important area of the law.

167. It is also important to keep in mind that, on any theoretical model, enforcing privacy
rights is notoriously tricky because legal enforcement mechanisms often draw even more attention to sensitive matters. See Gavison, supra note 12, at 457-67 (discussing these challenges in
some detail). Enforcing our privacy rights can be at least partially self-defeating because the
remedy may compound the harm if it requires us further to publicize private information, especially when the harm to be remedied derives from wrongful exposure of that information in the
first place. As a result, absent altogether different methods for vindicating privacy rights, only a
subset of privacy violations will be "worth" vindicating at all.
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